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Abstract
Background
Cash transfers and vouchers are forms of ‘demand-side financing’ that have been widely
used to promote maternal and newborn health in low- and middle-income countries during
the last 15 years.
Methods
This systematic review consolidates evidence from seven published systematic reviews on
the effects of different types of cash transfers and vouchers on the use and quality of mater-
nity care services, and updates the systematic searches to June 2015 using the Joanna
Briggs Institute approach for systematic reviewing. The review protocol for this update was
registered with PROSPERO (CRD42015020637).
Results
Data from 51 studies (15 more than previous reviews) and 22 cash transfer and voucher
programmes suggest that approaches tied to service use (either via payment conditionali-
ties or vouchers for selected services) can increase use of antenatal care, use of a skilled
attendant at birth and in the case of vouchers, postnatal care too. The strongest evidence of
positive effect was for conditional cash transfers and uptake of antenatal care, and for
vouchers for maternity care services and birth with a skilled birth attendant. However, effects
appear to be shaped by a complex set of social and healthcare system barriers and facilita-
tors. Studies have typically focused on an initial programme period, usually two or three
years after initiation, and many lack a counterfactual comparison with supply-side invest-
ment. There are few studies to indicate that programmes have led to improvements in qual-
ity of maternity care or maternal and newborn health outcomes.
Conclusion
Future research should use multiple intervention arms to compare cost-effectiveness with
similar investment in public services, and should look beyond short- to medium-term service
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Introduction
Prospective users of health services in many countries face financial costs for transport and
treatment and opportunity costs of receiving care, and such costs are well-documented barriers
for the uptake of maternity care services [1–3]. “Demand-side” financing in the health sector
was introduced to promote health by offsetting some associated financial costs or by increasing
household income or providing financial incentives to increase healthy behaviours. Five types
of demand-side financing have been used to promote maternal and newborn health [4]:
• Conditional cash transfers aim to increase utilisation of maternity care services by making
regular payments to households conditional on attendance at community meetings and/or
uptake of government health and education services.
• Unconditional cash transfers are similar regular payments but in the absence of conditions
for service utilisation, aim to alleviate the effects of poverty on maternal health.
• Short-term cash payments to offset costs are typically retrospective payments made at health-
care facilities to those who attend for care.
• Vouchers for maternity care services aim to reduce the cost of maternity care services at point
of use.
• Vouchers for ‘merit’ goods aim to reduce the cost of buying goods (such as food or insecti-
cide-treated nets) that promote maternal and newborn health.
To date there have been seven published systematic reviews of evidence on the impact of
aspects of demand-side financing on maternal health (Table 1). These concluded that demand-
side financing increases uptake of maternity care services shorter-term but evidence of popula-
tion level uptake over longer periods of time was limited. Few studies collated data for more
than two to three years, and therefore conclusions could not be drawn about longer-term
effects, and evidence did not enable impacts to be assessed on maternal and newborn health,
quality of care, or cost-effectiveness. Murray et al. 2014 [4] also noted that most studies included
in their review were unable to assess impacts on health outcomes due to small sample sizes.
Table 1. Systematic reviews of demand-side financing.
Systematic review Types of demand-side financing included
Lagarde et al. 2007 [5] Conditional cash transfers
Bellows et al. 2011 [6] Vouchers for maternity care services
Meyer et al. 2011 [7] Vouchers for maternity care services
Murray et al. 2012; 2014
[4,8]
Conditional cash transfers, unconditional cash transfers, short-term payments to
offset costs, vouchers for maternity care services and vouchers for merit goods
Brody et al. 2013 [9] Vouchers for maternity care services
Glassman et al. 2013
[10]
Conditional cash transfers and short-term payments to offset costs
Gopalan et al. 2014 [11] Conditional cash transfers, unconditional cash transfers, short-term payments to
offset costs and vouchers for maternity care services
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.t001
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Recent systematic reviews completed literature searches during or before June 2012
[4,8,10,11]. We conducted a systematic review to consolidate the previous reviews and
included additional studies (up to June 2015), in order to answer two questions: 1) what are
the effects of different demand-side financing interventions on maternity care service utilisa-
tion and maternal and newborn health outcomes in low- and middle-income countries, and 2)
what is the evidence on the cost-effectiveness of demand-side financing to increase utilisation
of maternity care services and improve maternal and newborn health outcomes?
In this paper, we present the results related to the impact on maternity care services utiliza-
tion, equity and quality of care. The complete report that details the information for all the out-
comes is available upon request from the corresponding author and the World Health
Organization.
Methods
This systematic review is an update of the effectiveness component of an earlier review of 72
articles (36 quantitative and 36 qualitative studies) registered with the Joanna Briggs Institute
(registration number 000592) [4,8]. The review protocol for this update (S1 Appendix) was
registered with PROSPERO (CRD42015020637), and is reported according to PRISMA guide-
lines (S2 Appendix).
The population of interest were women of all ages who were pregnant or within 42 days of
giving birth. Interventions of interest were any programme that incorporated demand-side
financing as a method to increase the utilisation of maternity care goods and services expected
to have an impact on maternal and newborn health outcomes. The review only considered
studies relevant to populations in low- and middle-income countries defined as such by the
World Bank at the time study data were collected.
The primary review outcomes were measures of utilisation of maternity care services,
including antenatal, birth and postnatal care. Other outcomes included equity, quality of care
as defined by study authors (including use of life-saving commodities) and cost-effectiveness,
maternal mortality and morbidity, perinatal and neonatal mortality and morbidity. Uptake of
family planning methods and services was not considered.
The review only included experimental and non-experimental (observational) study
designs. An earlier version of the review (by Murray et al.) conducted searches for 1990 to
June 2012. This review included the quantitative studies retrieved by Murray et al., those iden-
tified and included in other systematic reviews outlined in Table 1 and new studies that met
inclusion criteria published between July 2012 and June 2015. There were no limits on length
of follow-up, language of publication or publication status.
The following databases and e-journal services were searched: Applied Social Sciences
Index and Abstracts, ArticleFirst, British Development Library Services, EBSCO Host
(includes CINAHL and MEDLINE), Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, Econ-
Lit, Electronic Collections Online, HealthSource: Nursing/Academic Edition, International
Bibliography of the Social Sciences, Latin-American and Caribbean Center on Health Sci-
ences Information (LILACS), Sage Journals Online, ScienceDirect, SCOPUS, Social Policy
and Practice, Social Services Abstracts, Sociological Abstracts, SpringerLink, Web of Knowl-
edge, and Wiley Online Library. The search for unpublished studies included: Archives of
relevant governmental and non-governmental organisations and development banks, Intute,
Nexis UK, Mednar, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, Qual Page, Scirus, and WorldWi-
deScience.org.
A search using a matrix of 32 keywords and index terms was undertaken across all included
information sources, and a sample search strategy for SCOPUS is shown below:
Effects of cash transfers and vouchers on maternity care services: Systematic review
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1. (“child benefit” or “demand side financing” or “demand-side financing” or “family allow-
ance” OR “food stamp” or “maternity allowance” or “maternity benefit”)
2. (“cash transfer” or “monetary transfer” or “output-based aid” or “results-based financing”
or “reimbursement mechanism” or “voucher” or “incentive”)
3. (“abortion” or “antenatal” or “birth” or “infant” or “matern$” or “midwi$” or “neonat$” or
“obstetric” or “perinatal” or “postpartum” or “postnatal” or “pregnan$”).ti,ab
4. (“cost” or “cost-effectiv$” or “cost-utility” or “health service utili$” or “morbidity” or “mor-
tality”).ti,ab
5. 3 or 4
6. 1 and 5
7. 2 and 3
8. 6 or 7 [Limit to: Publication Year 2012–2015]
The title and abstracts of retrieved papers were screened against the following inclusion cri-
teria: date of publication, population of interest, intervention, context and outcome. For those
that appeared to meet inclusion criteria, a full-text paper was retrieved. Full-text papers were
then screened against the same criteria, and reference lists (including those of previous system-
atic reviews mentioned above) examined for relevant studies. Studies were excluded if the
methods were insufficiently described to allow assessment, if they lacked a comparator (time-
point or group), or if they lacked any testing for statistical significance.
Standardised critical appraisal instruments from the Joanna Briggs Institute were used to
assess papers for methodological validity and risk of bias (JBI-MAStARI for studies on health
outcomes, service use and quality of care, and JBI-ACTUARI for studies on costs and cost-
effectiveness) [12]. Two independent reviewers assessed each paper using a set of 9–11 ques-
tions and conferred. Questions included the representativeness of the study sample, strategies
for dealing with confounding factors and choice and measurement of outcomes.
The review team considered it important to give an overall quality rating to individual stud-
ies, a feature not included in the JBI approach, in order to facilitate interpretation of study find-
ings. A three point rating system (low-, medium- or high-quality) was adopted, similar to that
used to assess study bias by the Effective Public Health Practice Project (EPHPP) quality assess-
ment tool for quantitative studies [13]. In the current review the quality rating was based on the
reviewers’ overall assessment of each study. High-quality studies were those with appropriate
sampling strategies and analytical methods which collated data from a period spanning more
than three years after programme introduction to allow adequate time for longer-term effects
to be assessed. Disagreements were resolved through discussion, or with a third reviewer.
Data were extracted by two independent reviewers (BMH and DB) using standardised data
extraction tools from the Joanna Briggs Institute (JBI-MAStARI for data on health outcomes,
service use or quality of care, and JBI-ACTUARI for cost and cost-effectiveness data) [12].
Extracted data included specific details about the populations, interventions, context, study
methods, risk of bias and outcomes of significance to the review questions.
Data are presented in narrative form including tables to aid in data presentation where
appropriate. Meta-analyses could not be undertaken due to the heterogeneity of interventions,
settings, study designs and outcome measures. Albatross plots [14] were created to provide a
graphical overview of the data for interventions with more than five data points for an out-
come. Albatross plots are a scatter plot of p-values against the total number of individuals in
each study. Small p-values from negative associations appear at the left of the plot, small p-
Effects of cash transfers and vouchers on maternity care services: Systematic review
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values from positive associations at the right, and studies with null results towards the middle.
The plot allows p-values to be interpreted in the context of the study sample size; effect con-
tours show a standardised effect size (expressed as relative risk—RR) for a given p-value and
study size, providing an indication of the overall magnitude of any association. We estimated
an overall magnitude of association from these contours, but this should be interpreted
cautiously.
Exact p-values were extracted from all studies where possible, however studies only report-
ing that the p-value was not significant (e.g. p>0.05), and for which there was no means of cal-
culating the exact p-value, were displayed as a line for the valid range of p-values (e.g. 0.05 to
1). Equally, for studies stating only that a p-value was significant at a certain threshold (e.g.
p<0.05), that p-value was assumed to be equal to the threshold (e.g. p = 0.05). Relative risks
from effect contours were converted to attributable risks, assuming a control group uptake of
50%, to aid in interpretation. Studies were excluded from the plots if there was insufficient
information, usually because the number of study participants was not reported, and instances
of this are highlighted at appropriate points in the results section. Where studies reported sub-
groups rather than an overall result, the results from subgroups were taken, so each study may
provide more than one point on a plot.
In this paper we only present results relating to the impact of demand-side financing inter-
ventions on maternity care services utilisation, equity and quality of care. The ability of
demand-side financing interventions to impact on indicators of maternal and newborn mor-
bidity and mortality is unclear with little robust evidence that any of the five types of demand-
side financing considered improved these outcomes. Such outcomes are harder to measure
than utilisation. Included studies were generally methodologically poor with intervention out-
comes mainly considered in the short-term and with some contradictory findings.
Results
The systematic searches identified 10,380 individual records. After titles and abstracts were
screened, 241 full text articles were retrieved (Fig 1). Additionally, seven articles were identi-
fied in the reference lists of articles and other published systematic reviews. Of these, 79 quan-
titative studies were carried forward for critical appraisal. Twenty-eight did not meet
minimum requirements for methodological quality.
The review of effectiveness included 51 studies relating to 22 demand-side financing pro-
grammes: seven on conditional cash transfers, one on unconditional cash transfers, four on
short-term cash payments to offset costs of access, nine on vouchers for maternity care ser-
vices, and one on vouchers for merit goods. (See S3 and S4 appendices for critical appraisal
results and assessment of bias for each study, and study characteristics tables). Compared to
the earlier systematic review by Murray et al. 2014 [4], an additional 15 studies were included
in the current review.
The study designs reported varied, including six cluster randomised controlled trials
(RCTs); one quasi-experimental design and 41 observational studies: 18 observational studies
used before-and-after studies with comparison areas, four before-and-after studies without
comparison areas, 11 cross-sectional studies with comparison areas, and eight used panel data
as part of a retrospective area study. The five studies that examined data on costs, cost-effec-
tiveness or cost-utility (two of which are included above as they also included data on mater-
nity care service utilisation) were cross-sectional studies without comparison areas (but with
comparison time points).
Data sources ranged from national registers to small household surveys. The methodologi-
cal quality of the included studies varied. The most common weaknesses in study methods
Effects of cash transfers and vouchers on maternity care services: Systematic review
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Fig 1. Systematic review flowchart. From: Moher D, Liberati A, Tetzlaff J, Altman DG, The PRISMA Group (2009). Preferred Reporting
Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA Statement. PLoS Med 6(7): e1000097. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed1000097.
For more information, visit www.prisma-statement.org.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.g001
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included small sample sizes, follow-up periods less than three years, lack of adjustment to take
account of potential confounding factors or secular trends. As observational studies may not
have sufficient statistical power to detect ‘true’ effects, findings should be interpreted with
caution.
The findings are presented below according to type of demand-side financing.
Conditional cash transfers
Programmes that included conditional cash transfers typically focused on reducing poverty by
improving the health and education of children. Many included attendance at antenatal care
as a conditionality for payments, and some aimed to improve the health and wellbeing of preg-
nant women. Sixteen studies on conditional cash transfers were included, relating to seven
programmes (see Table 2):
• Bolsa Familia in Brazil [15,16],
• Comunidades Solidarias Rurales in El Salvador [17],
• Mi Familia Progresa in Guatemala [18].
• Programa de Asignacio´n Familia in Honduras [19],
• Program Keluarga Harapan in Indonesia [20,21],
• Prospera in Mexico [22–29], and
• Plan de Atencio´n Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES) in Uruguay [30],
Most of the studies were assessed as of medium quality. Study designs utilised survey and
register/facility data with large sample sizes and (where applicable) took advantage of a phased
programme roll-out. Methodological issues included potential leakage of vouchers or pay-
ments to control groups and short periods of time before follow-up surveys were conducted.
Methodological weaknesses were inherent in aggregation of datasets from diverse areas in
national studies and many studies did not disaggregate data using markers of known social
inequalities such as wealth quintile and geographic location.
Conditional cash transfers and antenatal care. Eight studies examined outcomes of con-
ditional cash transfers on uptake of antenatal care (Table A1 in S5 Appendix). Evidence of
effectiveness compared to control areas (‘usual care’) was found in one cluster RCT
(n = 11,002) of the Programa de Asignacio´n Familia in Honduras [19]. Similarly, evidence of
better outcomes in intervention areas compared to control areas was found in controlled
before-and-after studies of Guatemala’s Mi Familia Progresa (n = 4,563), Indonesia’s Program
Keluarga Harapan (n = 29,909) and Plan de Atencio´n Nacional a la Emergencia Social in Uru-
guay (n = 67,863) [18,20,30].
The controlled before-and-after study by Hernandez Prado et al. [27] of Mexico’s Prospera
programme found uptake of antenatal care varied depending on when the programme was
introduced in a particular area. One cluster RCT (n = 840 women) and one cross-sectional
study (n = 5,051) of the Prospera programme found no evidence of effect [23,28]. A controlled
before-and-after study (n = 556) of El Salvador’s Comunidades Solidarias Rurales also found
no evidence of effect on uptake of antenatal care [17].
The albatross plot for uptake of antenatal care is shown in Fig 2. Seven of the nine data
points showed a positive association between conditional cash transfers and antenatal care
uptake. Most of the studies were around the RR contour of 1.05, corresponding to about a 2–3
percentage point increase in uptake of antenatal care. However, the studies on Mi Familia
Effects of cash transfers and vouchers on maternity care services: Systematic review
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Table 2. Details of conditional cash transfer programmes included in the systematic review.
Programme/ Period of
implementation
Included studies, quality,
sample size and year data
collected
Maternal and newborn
health entitlements
Supply-side components Details of any
changes to
programme design
Source of
funding
Bolsa Familia, Brazil/
2003-present
Guanais (2013)—high
quality: 54,213 women
during 1998–2010 [15]; Shei
(2013)—high quality:
national data during 1998–
2008 [16]
Households receive, on
average, 170 real (USD 75)
monthly (conditional on
ANC visits for pregnant
women in a household)
No, but took place alongside
expansion of the Family
Health Program
None identified National
government
Comunidades
Solidarias Rurales, El
Salvador/2005-present
De Brauw and Peterman
(2011)—medium quality: 269
and 287 households at
baseline and follow-up during
2008 [17]
USD 30, monthly
(conditional on ANC visits
for pregnant women)
No, but took place alongside
investments in health system
infrastructure in intervention
areas
Phased roll-out,
beginning with
poorest areas
National
government
Mi Familia Progresa,
Guatemala/
2008-present
Gutierrez (2011)—medium
quality: 4,563 households
during 2009 and 2010 [18]
150 quetzales (USD 15),
monthly (conditional on
ANC visits for pregnant
women)
No None identified National
government
Programa de
asignacio´n Familiar,
Honduras/1990-present
Morris (2004)—medium
quality: 11,002 households
during 2000 and 2002 [19]
Vouchers worth 55
lempiras (USD 4), monthly
(conditional on ANC visits
for pregnant women)
No, but some intervention
areas were supposed to
receive funds for improving
healthcare infrastructure. A
study on the programme
indicated that this did not
take place (Morris et al.
2004)
Programme design
altered in 1998 to
increase value of
vouchers and revise
eligibility criteria
National
government
Program Keluarga
Harapan, Indonesia/
2008-present
Alatas et al. (2011)—medium
quality: 14,987 and 14,922
women at baseline and
follow-up during 2007 and
2009 [20]; Triyana (2012)—
medium quality: 14,987 and
14,922 women at baseline
and follow-up during 2007
and 2009 [21]
250,000 rupiah (USD 28)
per quarter to households
with a pregnant or lactating
mother (conditional on 4 x
ANC, SBA and 2 x PNC for
mothers and newborns)
No Piloted in five
provinces
National
government
Prospera (previously
Oportunidades),
Mexico/1997-present
Barber and Gertler (2008)—
medium quality: 840 women
during 2003 [23]; Barber and
Gertler (2009)—medium
quality: 892 women during
2003 [24]; Barber (2010)—
medium quality: 979 women
during 2003 [22]; Barham
(2011)—high quality: 19,421
women during 1992–2001
[25]; Hernandez Prado et al.
(2004a)—high quality: 2,445
municipalities during 1995–
2002 [26]; Hernandez Prado
et al. (2004b)—medium
quality: 29,041 and 7,802
women at baseline and
follow-up during 1998–2000
and 2003 [27]; Sosa-Rubai
et al. (2011)—high quality:
5,051 women during 2007
[28]; Urquieta et al. (2009)—
medium quality: 2,790
women during 1998 and
2000 [29]
180 pesos (USD 17),
monthly (conditional on five
ANC visits and attendance
at health education talks)
No Phased roll-out and
payment size
increased
periodically
National
government
(Continued )
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Progresa, Programa de Asignacio´n Familia and Program Keluarga Harapan all fall around the
1.05 RR contour, and have percentage point increases of 7.2–18.7, therefore a 10 percentage
point increase might be a more reasonable estimate of the effect of conditional cash transfers
on uptake of antenatal care; we considered this to be a large effect.
Conditional cash transfers and birth with a skilled birth attendant. Seven studies exam-
ined the effect of conditional cash transfers on births with a skilled birth attendant (Table A2
in S5 Appendix). A cross-sectional study (n = 5,051) of Mexico’s Prospera programme found
increased use of a skilled birth attendant in intervention compared to control areas [28], how-
ever another study of the same programme which used a controlled before-and-after design
(n = 36,843) reported that births with a skilled attendant varied between rural and urban areas
depending on when the programme was introduced [27]. Another controlled before-and-after
study of the Prospera programme (n = 2,790) found no evidence of effect [29].
A controlled before-and-after study (n = 556) of El Salvador’s Comunidades Solidarias Rur-
ales found the programme had some effect on births with a skilled birth attendant in interven-
tion compared to control areas, but differences were not statistically significant [17]. A
controlled before-and-after study (n = 29,909) of Indonesia’s Program Keluarga Harapan
found no evidence of effect [20], however another study (which used the same data but differ-
ent analyses) reported that the programme did increase births with a skilled attendant com-
pared to control areas [21]. A controlled before-and-after study (n = 67,863) on Uruguay’s
Plan de Atencio´n Nacional a la Emergencia Social found no evidence of effect [30].
The albatross plot for births with a skilled birth attendant is shown in Fig 3. Seven of the
nine data points showed a positive association, however the studies showed variation in the
magnitude of effect indicating there may be meaningful differences between them. Addition-
ally, the larger studies [20,30] showed no effect. Therefore, overall, the evidence showed only a
very small positive effect of conditional cash transfers on birth with a skilled birth attendant.
Conditional cash transfers and births in a healthcare facility. Three studies, all of which
used a controlled before and after design, examined the effect of conditional cash transfers on
births in a healthcare facility (Table 3). A study (n = 556) of El Salvador’s Comunidades Soli-
darias Rurales found some evidence that births in a healthcare facility increased when com-
pared to control areas [17]. A study (n = 4,563) of Guatemala’s Mi Familia Progresa found
some evidence that the programme increased births in small public healthcare facilities and
decreased births in public hospitals, although this was only reported in early intervention areas
[18]. The third study included in this section (n = 29,909) of Indonesia’s Program Keluarga
Harapan found no evidence of effect [20].
Conditional cash transfers and birth with a skilled birth attendant or birth in a health-
care facility in case of complications. Two studies examined the effect of Prospera on cae-
sarean section rates in Mexico. One cluster RCT (n = 979) indicated that the caesarean section
Table 2. (Continued)
Programme/ Period of
implementation
Included studies, quality,
sample size and year data
collected
Maternal and newborn
health entitlements
Supply-side components Details of any
changes to
programme design
Source of
funding
Plan de Atencio´n
Nacional a la
Emergencia Social
(PANES), Uruguay&
2005–2007
Amarante et al. (2011)—
medium quality: 67,863
women during 2003–2007
[30]
1,360 pesos (USD 55),
monthly (conditional on
regular ANC in 2007)
No Payment size
adjusted for inflation
National
government
Notes: ANC—antenatal care, SBA—birth with a skilled birth attendant, PNC—postnatal care
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.t002
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rate among recipients of Prospera was 14.5%, which was 5.1 percentage points higher than
non-recipients (p = 0.05) [22]. A controlled before-and-after study (n = 36,843) found no evi-
dence of effect on caesarean section rate (p>0.05), which was noted to be 19.5% among recipi-
ents in urban areas, 12.6% among recipients in early intervention rural areas and 16.9% in late
intervention areas [27].
Conditional cash transfers and postnatal care. Three studies examined the effect of con-
ditional cash transfers on uptake of postnatal care for women and their newborns (Table 4). A
controlled before-and-after study (n = 29,909) of Indonesia’s Program Keluarga Harapan
found an increase in the proportion of women and newborns who had two or more postnatal
contacts compared to women and newborns in the control group, but no evidence of an over-
all increase in the mean number of visits [20]. No evidence of effect on uptake of any postnatal
care for mothers and newborns was found by a cluster RCT (n = 11,002) of the Programa de
Asignacio´n Familia in Honduras [19], or a controlled before-and-after study (n = 556) of El
Salvador’s Comunidades Solidarias Rurales [17].
Fig 2. Albatross plot for effect of conditional cash transfer programmes on uptake of antenatal care. CSR—Comunidades Solidarias Rurales;
PANES—Plan de Atencio´n Nacional a la Emergencia Social; PdAF—Programa de Asignacio´n Familiar.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.g002
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Conditional cash transfers and quality of care. Only two included studies considered
the effect of conditional cash transfers on aspects of quality of care. Both studies defined ‘qual-
ity’ as the number of procedures undertaken during antenatal contacts. Barber and Gertler
[24] reported results from a cluster RCT study (n = 892 women) that measured receipt of 13
antenatal care components in Mexico such as history-taking and diagnostics, physical exami-
nation, prevention and case management. They found that recipients of Prospera programme
payments received 12.2% more antenatal procedures than non-recipients (p<0.001).
Triyana [21] developed an antenatal quality index based on receipt of diagnostic proce-
dures, information on pregnancy complications, vaccination and iron pills. Their controlled
before-and-after study (n = 29,909 women) found recipients of Program Keluarga Harapan
payments received 16.7 percentage points more antenatal procedures than non-recipients
(p<0.05).
Costs, cost-effectiveness and cost-utility of conditional cash transfers. Not measured
by included studies.
Fig 3. Albatross plot for effect of conditional cash transfer programmes on births with a skilled birth attendant. CSR—Comunidades Solidarias
Rurales; PANES—Plan de Atencio´n Nacional a la Emergencia Social.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.g003
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Unconditional cash transfers
One study examined the effect of Zambia’s Child Grant Programme, an unconditional cash
transfer programme, on maternal and newborn health outcomes [31]. Like many conditional
cash transfers, the Zambian Child Grant Programme (2010-present) aims to reduce poverty by
improving the welfare of children and payments are distributed regularly to women living in
districts with highest rates of child mortality and morbidity. The programme, funded by the
Zambian Government, offers recipients 60 kwacha (USD 12) every two months.
Handa et al.’s [31] cluster RCT study used data from two household surveys. Baseline data
were collected in 2010 and a follow-up survey was conducted in 2012. Handa et al. found no
evidence of effect of the Child Grant Programme on uptake of antenatal care or on birth with a
skilled birth attendant. The study also found no evidence of effect on receipt of specific
Table 3. Effect of conditional cash transfers on births attended at a healthcare facility.
Study Study
data
Effect 95% confidence interval, standard
error or p-value
Program Keluarga Harapan, Indonesia
(2008-present)
Alatas et al. (2011) 2007,
2009
No evidence of effect p>0.05
Comunidades Solidarias Rurales, El
Salvador (2005-present)
De Brauw and Peterman (2011) 2008 22.8 percentage point increase se: 5.2 (p<0.01)
Mi Familia Progresa, Guatemala
(2008-present)
Gutierrez et al. (2011) 2009,
2010
5.0 percentage point decrease in birth in public hospitals
in early intervention areas
p<0.1
3.0 percentage point increase in births in health posts in
early intervention areas
p<0.1
No evidence of effect in late-intervention areas p>0.1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.t003
Table 4. Effect of conditional cash transfers on uptake of postnatal care for mothers and newborns.
Study Study data Effect 95% confidence interval, standard error or p-
value
Comunidades Solidarias Rurales, El Salvador
(2005-present)
De Brauw and Peterman (2011) 2008 No evidence of effect1 p>0.1
Programa de Asignacio´n Familia, Honduras
(1990-present)
Morris et al. (2004) 2000,
2002
No evidence of effect1 p>0.05
Program Keluarga Harapan, Indonesia (2008-present)
Alatas et al. (2011) 2007,
2009
No evidence of effect2 p>0.05
7.0 percentage point
increase3
se: 0.3 (p<0.05)
Notes.
1 any postnatal care
2 mean number of visits
3 two or more postnatal visits
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.t004
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procedures during antenatal care (receipt of testing and counselling for HIV, tetanus vaccina-
tion and malaria treatment).
Short-term cash payments to offset costs
Short-term cash payments have been used in some countries to offset the costs of accessing
maternity care services. Unlike conditional and unconditional cash transfer programmes
which aim to reduce poverty by regularly distributing payments to households, short-term
cash payments are made retrospectively and on a small, defined number of occasions. Condi-
tionalities for receipt of payments typically include birth in a healthcare facility and may
include attendance at antenatal care and postnatal care for mothers and newborns. Thirteen
studies on short-term cash payment programmes, relating to four programmes were included
(Table 5):
• Janani Suraksha Yojana in India [32–40],
• Safe Delivery Incentive Programme in Nepal [41,42],
• CHIMACA programme in China [43], and
• SURE-P programme in Nigeria [44].
The included studies on short-term cash payment programmes were assessed to be of
medium quality. Most had large sample sizes however findings are based on follow-up data
typically collected only one or two years after programme launch. Many studies from India
used the same national survey datasets with the assumption that women who reported receipt
of any payment in the survey had received a payment as part of the Janani Suraksha Yojana
programme.
Short-term payments and antenatal care. Nine studies examined the effect of short-term
cash payments on uptake of antenatal care (Table A3 in S5 Appendix). One retrospective area
study (n = 14,799 women) of Nepal’s Safe Delivery Incentive Programme found an increase in
the mean number of antenatal visits [41]. Three controlled before-and-after studies (sample
sizes ranging from 4,770 women to 1,340,427 households) and one cross-sectional study
(n = 424 women) of India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana found evidence that the programme
increased the proportion of women receiving three or more antenatal visits compared to
women who were not programme-recipients [35–37,39]. One controlled before-and-after
study (n = 425,708 women) and one cross-sectional study (n = 2,267 women) found no differ-
ences in uptake of antenatal care [34,40]. A retrospective area study (n = 20,133 women) of
Nigeria’s SURE-P programme found no increase in receipt of any antenatal care [44] and a
cluster RCT (n = 592 women) on the CHIMACA programme in China found no evidence of
effect on number of antenatal contacts women received [43].
Disaggregated data on Janani Suraksha Yojana presented by Lim et al. [35] showed that the
programme had a greater effect on the proportion of women receiving three or more antenatal
visits in high-focus states (where payments are larger and are made irrespective of income or
parity) than in non-high-focus states.
The albatross plot of short-term payments on uptake of antenatal care is shown in Fig 4.
Although eight of the 12 data points showed a positive effect, the studies showed no particular
trend along any contour. With the exception of Santhya et al. [39], which showed a very large
positive effect (odds ratio of 2.2), the data points tended to fall around the null, possibly
favouring a positive association. This suggests a very limited (but possibly positive) effect of
short-term payments on uptake of antenatal care.
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Short-term payments and birth with a skilled birth attendant. Seven studies considered
effects of short-term cash payment programmes on births with a skilled birth attendant
(Table A4 in S5 Appendix). Four controlled before-and-after studies (using sample sizes rang-
ing from 4,770 women to 1,340,427 households) on Janani Suraksha Yojana in India found
evidence that the programme increased births with a skilled birth attendant among recipients
compared to non-recipients [34–36,39]. Two studies of Nepal’s Safe Delivery Incentive Pro-
gramme (one cross-sectional study with a sample size of 5,901, and one retrospective area
study with 14,799) found a positive benefit on outcomes assessed compared to control areas
[41,42]. No evidence of effect was found by a retrospective area study (n = 20,133) on Nigeria’s
SURE-P programme [44].
Table 5. Details of short-term cash payment programmes included in the systematic review.
Programme Included studies, quality and sample size Maternal and
newborn health
entitlements
Supply-side
components
Period of
programme
implementation
Details of any
changes to
programme
design
Source of
funding
CHIMACA
programme,
China
Hemminki et al. (2013)—medium quality:
592 women during 2008–2009 [43]
Payment of up to
20 renminbi (USD
3) for women who
used ANC
No 2007–2009 None identified European
Commission
Janani Suraksha
Yojana, India
Amudhan et al. (2013)—medium quality:
7,796 women during 2006–2010 [32];
Carvalho et al. (2014)—medium quality:
23,924 women during 2007–2009 [33];
Joshi and Sivaram (2014)—medium quality:
425,708 women during 2002–2004 and
2007–2009 [34]; Lim et al. (2010)—medium
quality: 182,869 women during 2002–2004
and 2007–2009 [35]; Mazumdar et al.
(2012)—medium quality: 344,903 women
during 2002–2004 and 2007–2009 [36];
Purohit et al. (2014)—low quality: 424
women during 2011 [37]; Randive et al.
(2013)—medium quality: unknown sample
size during 2005–2010 and 2010–2011 [38];
Santhya et al. (2011)—medium quality:
4,770 women during 2009 and 2010 [39];
Vora et al. (2012)—medium quality: 2,267
women during 2007–2009 [40]
Up to 1,400
rupees (USD 32)
in one payment,
given after FB
No, but part of
the broader
National Rural
Health Mission
which invested
in healthcare
infrastructure
2006-present None identified National
government
Safe Delivery
Incentive
Programme,
Nepal
Powell-Jackson et al. (2009)—medium
quality: 14,799 women during 2001–2007
[45]; Powell-Jackson and Hanson (2012)—
medium quality: 5,901 women during 2008
[42]
Up to 1,500
rupees (USD 23)
in one payment
(conditional on
FB)
Incentive
payment to a
health worker
who attends a
birth
2005-present Removed parity
restrictions;
expanded
participating
healthcare
facilities to
include private
sector
National
government
Subsidy
Reinvestment
and
Empowerment
Programme
(SURE-P),
Nigeria
Okoli et al. (2014)—medium quality: 20,133
women during 2013–2014 [44]
Up to 5,000 naira
(USD 30) in
seven payments
after receipt of
maternity care
services
(conditional on 4 x
ANC, SBA and
PNC for mothers
and newborns)
Part of the
SURE-P
programme,
which includes
supply-side
investment in
intervention
areas
2013-present None identified National
government
Notes: ANC—antenatal care, FB—birth in a healthcare facility, SBA—birth with a skilled birth attendant, PNC—postnatal care
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.t005
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One of the studies on Janani Suraksha Yojana, using a controlled before-and-after design
(n = 1,340,427 households) disaggregated data by type of state (high-focus states as defined by
the National Health Mission with low rates of births in healthcare facilities where payments
are larger and made irrespective of income or parity, vs. non-high-focus) and found that the
programme’s impact on use of skilled birth attendants was greater in high-focus states [35].
Another controlled before-and-after study (n = 4,770 women) found that the impact of Janani
Suraksha on use of skilled birth attendants was similar regardless of whether women lived in
an urban or rural area [39].
A controlled before-and-after study (n = 5,901) of Nepal’s Safe Delivery Incentive Pro-
gramme conducted additional analyses to examine heterogeneity in programme effects and
found no association between household wealth and programme effect, and that higher pay-
ment size relative to costs (as payment size varied according to terrain type) increased the pro-
gramme’s effect [42]. They also found that the programme was associated with better quality
of care. This was measured using data collected in a survey of health providers, and a scoring
system according to whether a healthcare facility had performed any of the following in the
preceding three months: administered parenteral antibiotics, oxytocics, and/or
Fig 4. Albatross plot for effect of short-term cash payments on uptake of antenatal care. SDIP—Safe Delivery Incentive Programme.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.g004
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anticonvulsants; performed manual removal of placenta and/or retained products; performed
assisted vaginal delivery and/or caesarean section; given a blood transfusion; referred a woman
by ambulance, and/or provided 24 hour maternity care services).
The albatross plot of short-term payments on birth with a skilled birth attendant is shown
in Fig 5. Six of the seven data points showed a positive effect; the likely magnitude of effect is
around the 1.05 RR contour, corresponding to a 2–3 percentage point increase on birth with a
skilled birth attendant; we considered this to be a small effect.
Short-term payments and births in healthcare facilities. Eight studies examined the
effect of short-term cash payments on whether births took place in healthcare facilities
(Table A5 in S5 Appendix). A quasi-experimental study (n = 7,796) and four controlled
before-and-after studies (sample sizes ranging from 4,770 women to 1,340,427 households)
found evidence that India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana increased births in healthcare facilities
[32,35,36,38,39] although a later cross-sectional study (n = 2,267) reported that the programme
increased births at healthcare facilities in one Indian state, but not in another state [40]. A ret-
rospective area study (n = 14,799) of Nepal’s Safe Delivery Incentive Programme found no
impact on place of birth [41], however a cross-sectional study (n = 5,901) found evidence that
Fig 5. Albatross plot for effect of short-term cash payments on births with a skilled birth attendant. SDIP—Safe Delivery Incentive Programme.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.g005
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the programme increased births at healthcare facilities among women who were aware of the
programme, compared to those who were not [42].
Disaggregated data from the controlled before-and-after study referred to above by Lim
et al. [35] showed that Janani Suraksha Yojana had a greater effect on increasing births in facil-
ities in high-focus states than in non-high-focus states, with findings corroborated by another
controlled before-and-after study (n = 5,903 women) and a quasi-experimental study
(n = 7,796 women) [32,36]. The smaller controlled before-and-after study also found that
births in healthcare facilities were similar for women regardless of household wealth or ethnic-
ity [36]. Janani Suraksha Yojana’s effect on increasing births at healthcare facilities was similar
to the effect on location of births following upgrading a healthcare facility to provide access to
free 24-hour care [32].
Another controlled before-and-after study (n = 4,770) disaggregated data by type of geogra-
phy and found that the effect of Janani Suraksha Yojana on place of birth was similar in rural
and urban settings [39].
The albatross plot of short-term payments on birth in a healthcare facility is shown in Fig 6.
One study [38] was not included in the albatross plot as the number of study participants was
Fig 6. Albatross plot for effect of short-term cash payments on health facility births. SDIP—Safe Delivery Incentive Programme.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.g006
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not available. All eight data points showed a positive effect; the likely magnitude of effect is
around the 1.1 RR contour, corresponding to a 5 percentage point increase on birth in a
healthcare facility; we considered this to be a moderate effect.
Short-term payments and birth with a skilled birth attendant or birth in healthcare
facilities in case of complications. Five studies examined the effect of short-term cash pay-
ment programmes on caesarean section rates (Table A6 in S5 Appendix). A cluster RCT
(n = 592 women) of the CHIMACA programme in China (which offered payments to women
if they attended antenatal care), using 104 towns in five counties as clusters, found evidence
that the programme increased caesarean section rates, which were 67.1% among intervention
clusters and 56.0% among control clusters [43]. A controlled before-and-after study (n = 5,903
women) of India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana found no evidence of effect on caesarean section
rates [36], however a cross-sectional study (n = 2,267) found rates increased in one state
(where it was 15%) with no evidence of effect in another state [40]. A retrospective area study
(n = 14,799) of Nepal’s Safe Delivery Incentive Programme found no evidence of effect on cae-
sarean rates however one cross-sectional study (n = 5,901) found evidence that the programme
increased caesarean section rates (from a baseline of 3%) and assisted births compared among
women who knew about the programme before giving birth [41].
The albatross plot of short-term payments on caesarean section rates in case of maternal or
foetal complications is shown in Fig 7. Five of the eight data points showed a null association;
the three remaining studies showed a small positive association. Overall, there is no evidence
to show an effect of short-term payments on caesarean section rates.
Short-term payments and postnatal care. Four studies examined the effect of short-term
cash payments on receipt of postnatal care for women and newborns (Table A7 in S5 Appendix).
A controlled before-and-after study (n = 425,708 women) of India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana
reported that the programme was associated with a decrease in the proportion of women and
newborns who received a postnatal check within two weeks of the birth [34]. One cross-sectional
study (n = 23,924 women) found evidence that the same programme increased receipt of a post-
natal check for women and newborns within 24 hours of birth [33] while another cross-sectional
study (n = 424 women) also reported that the proportion of women and newborns who received
postnatal care increased, but did not explain how postnatal care was defined or measured [37].
A cluster RCT (n = 592 women) of the CHIMACA programme found no evidence of effect on
receipt of at least one postnatal contact for mothers and newborns [43].
Two studies examined the effect of short-term cash payments on receipt of maternal postpar-
tum care only. One controlled before-and-after study (n = 4,770 women) found that recipients
of India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana were significantly more likely to receive a postpartum check-
up within 48 hours of giving birth compared to non-recipients [39]. A cross-sectional study
(n = 23,924) found evidence of a 24.8 percentage point increase (compared to non-recipients of
the programme) in receipt of a postpartum check-up within 48 hours of giving birth [33].
The albatross plot of short-term payments on uptake of postnatal care for women and new-
borns is shown in Fig 8. Four of the six data points showed a negative effect, including the larg-
est study of 419,156 women [34]. Given this, and that all CHIMACA programme data points
came from the same study [43], the evidence showed there is likely a small negative or no asso-
ciation between short-term payments and uptake of postnatal care.
Short-term payments and quality of care. Three studies examined the effect of short-
term cash payments on quality of care. One controlled before-and-after study (n = 4,770
women—Santhya et al. [39]) and one cross-sectional study (n = 424 women—Purohit et al.
[37]) of Janani Suraksha Yojana reported that more women (p<0.01) were discharged from
hospital after at least 24 hours in-patient stay. Santhya et al. also examined receipt of specific
procedures. While women who received Janani Suraksha Yojana payments were more likely to
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have been offered information on warning signs and symptoms of adverse health during preg-
nancy (p<0.05) there were no statistically significant differences in the reporting of receipt of
information on postnatal care and neonatal health, clean healthcare facilities, respectful care
from members of staff, or use of harmful practices during childbirth (fundal pressure or intra-
muscular oxytocin to expedite birth).
The cluster RCT (n = 592 women) by Hemminki et al. [43] found evidence that short-term
cash payments in the CHIMACA programme increased receipt of some antenatal care proce-
dures (nutrition advice and danger signs and symptoms advice), however no evidence of effect
on receipt of other procedures (blood pressure and anaemia tests).
Costs, cost-effectiveness and cost-utility of short-term payments. Not measured by the
included studies.
Vouchers for maternity care services
Voucher entitlements typically include labour and birth care in a programme-affiliated (often
accredited) healthcare facility and a defined number of antenatal and postnatal care contacts.
Fig 7. Albatross plot for effect of short-term cash payments on birth with a skilled birth attendant or birth in healthcare facilities in case of
complications. SDIP—Safe Delivery Incentive Programme.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.g007
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Some programmes have included access to a combination of public and private providers and
some only included access to private sector facilities. The review included 19 studies on vouch-
ers for maternity care services, relating to nine programmes (Table 6):
• Bangladesh’s Maternal Health Voucher Scheme [46–48]
• a pilot voucher scheme in Bangladesh [49],
• a voucher programme in Cambodia [50],
• India’s Chiranjeevi Yojana [51–53]
• Sambhav vouchers in India [54],
• Kenya’s Vouchers for Health programme [55–59],
• pilot voucher schemes in Pakistan [60,61],
• HealthyBaby vouchers in Uganda [62],
• Mekerere University Voucher programme in Uganda [63,64].
Fig 8. Albatross plot for effect of short-term cash payments on postnatal care for mothers and newborns.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.g008
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Table 6. Details of vouchers for maternity care services included in the systematic review.
Programme Included studies,
quality and sample size
Maternal and
newborn health
entitlements
Supply-side
components
Period of
programme
implementation
Details of any
changes to
programme design
Source of
funding
Pilot
programme,
Bangladesh
Rob et al. (2009)—low
quality: 436 and 414
women at baseline and
follow-up during 2007
and 2008 [49]
Vouchers were
targeted to poor
women, distributed
free of charge and
entitled the holder to
3 x ANC, childbirth
services, 1 x PNC for
mother and newborn,
and transport costs
for each service
Payments to
healthcare
providers for care
2007–2008 None identified International non-
governmental
organisation
(Population
Council)
Maternal
Health
Voucher
Scheme,
Bangladesh
Ahmed and Khan (2011)
—medium quality: 3,600
women during 2008 [46];
Hatt et al. (2010)—
medium quality: 2,208
women during 2009 [47];
Nguyen et al. (2012)—
medium quality: 2,208
women during 2009 [48]
Vouchers are
targeted to poor
women or distributed
universally
(depending on the
district), are
distributed free of
charge and entitle the
holder to 3 x ANC, FB
or SBA at home, 1 x
PNC for mother and
newborn, CS, and
transport costs, a gift
box and cash for
women who give birth
in a facility
Payments to
healthcare
providers for care
2007-present None identified National
government
Voucher
programme,
Cambodia
Van de Poel et al. (2014)
—medium quality: 18,754
women during 2010 [50]
Vouchers were
targeted to poor
women or distributed
universally
(depending on the
district), free of
charge and entitled
the holder to ANC,
FB and PNC for
mother and newborn
at government
healthcare facilities
Payments to
healthcare
providers for care
2007–2010 None identified National
government
Chiranjeevi
Yojana, India
Bhat et al. (2009)—low
quality: 656 women
during 2006 [65]; De
Costa et al. (2014)—high
quality: state-wide data
during 2000–2010 [52];
Mohanan et al. (2014)—
high quality: 12,081
women during 2007–
2009 and 2010 [53]
Free maternity care
services for women
with a below poverty
line card
Payments to
healthcare
providers for care
2005-present Phased roll-out;
Reimbursement rates
for providers increased
State government
Sambhav
scheme, India
IFPS Project (2012)—
medium quality
(economic study): one
district [54]
Vouchers were
targeted to poor
women, distributed
free of charge and
entitled the holder to
3 x ANC, FB and
PNC for mother and
newborn at
accredited private
hospitals
Payments to
healthcare
providers for care
2007–2013 None identified Bilateral donor
(USAID)
(Continued )
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Table 6. (Continued)
Programme Included studies,
quality and sample size
Maternal and
newborn health
entitlements
Supply-side
components
Period of
programme
implementation
Details of any
changes to
programme design
Source of
funding
Vouchers for
Health, Kenya
Amendah et al. (2013)—
medium quality: 627
women during 2006–
2012 [55]; Bellows et al.
(2012)—medium quality:
1,914 and 2,448 women
at baseline and follow-up
during 2006 and 2009
[56]; Obare et al. (2012)
—medium quality: 2,527
women during 2010–
2011 [58]; Obare et al.
(2014)—medium quality:
2,933 and 3,094 women
at baseline and follow-up
during 2010–2011 and
2012 [57]; Watt et al.
(2015)—low quality: 934
and 569 women at
baseline and follow-up
during 2010 and 2012
[59]
Vouchers are
targeted to poor
women, sold for 200
shillings (USD 2.50)
and entitle the holder
to 4 x ANC, FB
(including CS and
treatment of neonatal
complications if
necessary) and PNC
for mother and
newborn up to six
weeks after childbirth
Payments to
healthcare
providers for care
2006-present Pilot scheme managed
by a parastatal
organisation. Phased
expansion and transfer
to Ministry of Health
control. Switched from
commission-based to
salaried voucher
distributors
Early phases
funded by bilateral
donor (KfW,
Germany).
National
government has
begun to
contribute
Pilot
programmes,
Pakistan
Agha (2011a)—medium
quality: 2,018 and 2,033
women at baseline and
follow-up during 2009
and 2010 [60]; Agha
(2011b)—low quality: 681
and 742 women at
baseline and follow-up
during 2010 [61]
Voucher booklets
were targeted to poor
women, sold for 100
rupees (USD 1.20)
and entitled the
holder to 3 x ANC,
FB, 1 x PNC for
mother and newborn,
CS
Payments to
healthcare
providers for care
Urban: 2008–
2009; Rural: 2010
None identified Bilateral donor
(USAID)
HealthyBaby
vouchers,
Uganda
Reproductive Health
Vouchers Evaluation
Team (2012)—low
quality: 2,443 and 2,895
at baseline and follow-up
during 2008 and 2010–
2011 [62]
Vouchers are
targeted to poor
women, sold for
3,000 shillings (USD
1.50) and entitle the
holder to 4 x ANC,
childbirth services
and PNC
Payments to
healthcare
providers for care
2008-present Maternal health
vouchers added to an
existing reproductive
health voucher
programme
Bilateral donor
(KfW, Germany)
and the World
Bank
Makerere
Voucher
Programme,
Uganda
Alfonso et al. (2015)—
low quality (economic
study) and medium
quality (quantitative
study): sample chosen
from among 810,618
women during 2007–
2011 [63]; Mayora et al.
(2014)—low quality
(economic study) [64]
Vouchers were
distributed universally
in intervention areas,
were free of charge
and entitled the
holders to FB and
transportation. PNC
for mother and
newborn was
included if mother/
newborn experienced
complications
Payments to
healthcare
providers for care,
and transport
providers received
fixed payments for
the average
distance to travel in
the intervention
area
2009–2011 Antenatal care and PN
vouchers withdrawn
after pilot (2009–2010)
due to unexpectedly
large demand for
vouchers
International non-
governmental
organisation (Bill
and Melinda
Gates
Foundation)
Notes: ANC—antenatal care, FB—birth in healthcare facilities, SBA—birth with a skilled birth attendant, PNC—postnatal care, CS—caesarean section in
case of obstetric complications
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.t006
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The studies were of medium quality and typically used controlled before-and-after
approaches to compare intervention and control areas, with data analysis including regression
analyses to control for potential confounding. Weaknesses included small sample sizes, non-
random sampling strategies, and risk of leakage across study groups.
Vouchers for maternity care services and antenatal care. The effect of vouchers on
uptake of antenatal care was examined by 11 studies (Table A8 in S5 Appendix—a report by
Hatt et al. [47] was excluded from this section as it reported the same research as Nguyen et al.
[48]). A before-and-after study without controls (n = 850 women) of a pilot programme in
Bangladesh found evidence of an increase (compared to baseline findings) in the proportion of
women receiving any antenatal care and proportion of women receiving three or more antena-
tal check-ups [49]. Similarly, two cross-sectional studies (n = 3,600 women and n = 2,208
women) of Bangladesh’s Maternal Health Voucher Scheme reported increases in the propor-
tion of women receiving any antenatal care in intervention areas (compared to control areas)
and increases in the proportion of women receiving three or more antenatal check-ups in
intervention areas and among voucher recipients (compared to non-recipients) [46,48]. A
before-and-after study without controls (n = 5,338) of Uganda’s HealthyBaby vouchers found
that the programme increased the proportion of women receiving four or more antenatal
checks in intervention areas compared to baseline areas prior to voucher distribution [62].
One before-and-after study without controls (n = 4,362 women) of Kenya’s Vouchers for
Health programme found that receipt of any antenatal care and of at least four antenatal con-
tacts increased among recipients, but no evidence of an effect in intervention areas overall
[56]. Similarly, a cross-sectional study of the same programme reported no differences in num-
ber of antenatal contacts women attended in intervention areas [58]. Findings from a pilot
programme in Pakistan (n = 4,051 women) reported increased receipt of at least three antena-
tal check-ups among voucher recipients (compared to non-recipients) [60], however another
similar study (n = 1,423 women) found evidence of increased antenatal care uptake among
women in the second poorest quintile but not amongst women who were in the poorest quin-
tile [61].
A controlled before-and-after study (n = 12,081 women) of the Chiranjeevi Yojana pro-
gramme in India found no evidence of an increase in uptake of antenatal care [53], and a
cross-sectional study (n = 18,754) of a pilot voucher programme in Cambodia found no
increase in the proportion of women who received three or more antenatal check-ups [50].
The albatross plot for the uptake of antenatal care is shown in Fig 9. All 11 data points show
a positive association and most points fall around the RR effect contour of 1.1, corresponding
to a 5 percentage point increase; we considered this to be a moderate effect.
Vouchers for maternity care services and birth with a skilled birth attendant. Five
studies examined the effect of vouchers for maternity care services on birth with a skilled birth
attendant (Table A9 in S5 Appendix—a report by Hatt et al. [47] was excluded from this sec-
tion as it reported on the same data as Nguyen et al. [48]). A before-and-after study without
controls (n = 850 women) found evidence that a pilot voucher scheme in Bangladesh increased
births with a skilled birth attendant compared to baseline [49], and two cross-sectional studies
(n = 3,600 women and n = 2,208 women) of Bangladesh’s Maternal Health Voucher Scheme
found the programme increased births with a skilled birth attendant [46,48]. Bellows et al. [56]
undertook a before-and-after study without controls (n = 4,362 women) of Kenya’s Vouchers
for Health programme which found that the programme increased the proportion of women
who had access to a skilled birth attendant in intervention areas and among voucher recipi-
ents. However a cross-sectional study (n = 2,527 women) which included data on women who
had access to the same programme only found evidence of impact on birth with a skilled birth
attendant in early intervention but not late-intervention areas [58].
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A cross-sectional study (n = 3,600 women) of Bangladesh’s Maternal Health Voucher
Scheme, using data from a district where voucher distribution was universal, indicated that
births with a skilled birth attendant increased among the poorest and richest terciles, but
inequity (measured as the ratio of uptake between the richest and the poorest terciles) was
reduced [46].
The albatross plot for births with a skilled birth attendant is shown in Fig 10. All seven stud-
ies showed a positive association; the magnitude of effect was likely more than a RR of 1.25,
corresponding to a 12–13 percentage point increase; we considered this to be a large effect.
Vouchers for maternity care services and births in healthcare facilities. The impact of
vouchers for maternity care services on proportions of births attended at healthcare facilities
was examined by 13 studies (Table A10 in S5 Appendix—a report by Hatt et al. [47] and an
article by Obare et al. [58] were excluded from this section as they reported the same research
as Nguyen et al. [48], and Obare et al. [57], respectively). A before-and-after study without
controls (n = 850 women) of a pilot voucher scheme in Bangladesh found an increase in births
in healthcare facilities compared to baseline [49], and two cross-sectional studies (n = 3,600
women and n = 2,208 women) of Bangladesh’s Maternal Health Voucher Scheme found
Fig 9. Albatross plot for effect of vouchers for maternity care services on uptake of antenatal care. MHVS—Maternal Health Voucher Scheme.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.g009
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evidence of an increase compared to in intervention areas or among recipients [46,48]. Simi-
larly, a cross-sectional study (n = 18,754) of a pilot voucher scheme in Cambodia found evi-
dence of a positive effect on birth in healthcare facilities in intervention areas [50].
Three before-and-after studies (n = 6,027 women, n = 4,362 women and n = 627 women)
found that the Vouchers for Health programme in Kenya increased the proportion of births in
healthcare facilities in intervention areas, with women who received vouchers more likely to
give birth in healthcare facilities in intervention areas [55–57]. Similarly, two before-and-after
studies (n = 4,051 women and n = 1,423 women) of pilot voucher programmes in Pakistan
also found births in healthcare facilities increased among recipients and more generally in
intervention areas compared to areas assessed before roll out of the intervention [60,61]. A
controlled before-and-after study (n = 5,338 women) determined that Uganda’s HealthyBaby
vouchers increased births in healthcare facilities in intervention areas [62], and a retrospective
area study (n = 810,618 women) of Uganda’s Makerere University Voucher Scheme found the
programme increased births in participating hospitals [63]. No evidence of impact on births in
healthcare facilities was found by studies of the Chiranjeevi Yojana [52,53].
Fig 10. Albatross plot for effect of vouchers for maternity care services on births with a skilled birth attendant. MHVS—Maternal Health Voucher
Scheme.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.g010
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Disaggregated data presented in a cross-sectional study of Bangladesh’s Maternal Health
Voucher Scheme, using data from a district where voucher distribution was universal, indi-
cated that the programme increased births in healthcare facilities among women in the poorest
and in the richest terciles, but that inequity between the groups appeared smaller [46]. Simi-
larly, a cross-sectional study of a pilot voucher programme in Cambodia found births in
healthcare facilities increased among the poorest 40% of households regardless of whether
voucher distribution was universal or targeted to the poorest households, but births in health-
care facilities did not increase among the other 60% of households [50]. Data from a before-
and-after study on a pilot targeted voucher programme in Pakistan indicated that births in
healthcare facilities increased for recipients of the vouchers, and disaggregated data showed
increases for all wealth quintiles except the least poor [60]. A before-and-after study on a simi-
lar pilot voucher programme in another area in Pakistan found that births in healthcare facili-
ties increased overall (p<0.001) and disaggregated data showed that the increase was limited
to the poorest quintile [61].
The albatross plot for births in a healthcare facility is shown in Fig 11. Two studies [52,63]
were not included in the albatross plot as the number of participants in each study was not
available. Ten of the eleven studies showed a positive association; the magnitude of effect is
likely to be a little above a RR of 1.1, corresponding to at least a 5 percentage point increase; we
considered this to be a moderate effect.
Vouchers for maternity care services and birth with a skilled birth attendant or births
in healthcare facilities in case of complications. Three studies examined the effect of vouch-
ers for maternity care services on birth outcomes in cases of obstetric complication (a report
by Hatt et al. [47] was excluded from this section as it reported the same research as Nguyen
et al. [48]). The cross-sectional study (n = 3,600 women) by Ahmed and Khan [46] of Bangla-
desh’s Maternal Health Voucher Scheme found that odds of seeking medical assistance in case
of obstetric complications among women who were voucher recipients was 1.5 (p<0.01) com-
pared to non-recipients. Data disaggregated by wealth quintile indicated that the vouchers,
which were distributed universally in the study district, increased treatment-seeking in case of
obstetric complications for the richest tercile but not the poorest tercile.
A cross-sectional study (n = 2,208 women) by Nguyen et al. [48] found no evidence of effect
(p>0.05) from the Maternal Health Voucher Scheme on caesarean section rate. Similarly, a
cross-sectional study (n = 18,754) by van de Poel et al. [50] on a voucher programme in Cam-
bodia found no differences in caesarean section rates compared to control areas.
Vouchers for maternity care services and postnatal care. Ten studies examined the
effect of vouchers for maternity care services on postnatal care for mothers and newborns
(Table A11 in S5 Appendix—a report by Hatt et al. [47] was excluded from this section as it
reported the same research as Nguyen et al. [48]). Rob et al. [49] undertook a pilot study of a
voucher scheme in Bangladesh which found that the programme increased the proportion of
women and newborns receiving any postnatal care compared to baseline, and two cross-sec-
tional studies (n = 3,600 women and n = 2,208 women) found that Bangladesh’s Maternal
Health Voucher Scheme increased receipt of postnatal care for mothers and newborns among
voucher recipients and in intervention areas [46,48]. Increased receipt of any postnatal care
for mothers and newborns in intervention areas was also found in a study of Uganda’s Health-
Baby vouchers which included data on 5,338 women [62], a similar finding to a cross-sectional
study (n = 18,754) on a pilot voucher scheme in Cambodia [50].
A pilot voucher scheme in Pakistan which included data on 4,501 women found evidence
of an increase in receipt of any postnatal care for mothers and newborns among voucher recip-
ients (compared to non-recipients) [61], however a controlled before-and-after study
(n = 1,423) found only a modest increase in postnatal care for the recipients of vouchers [60].
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No evidence of effect on recipient of any postnatal care for mothers and newborns was found
by studies on Chiranjeevi Yojana in India and Vouchers for Health in Kenya [53,58,65].
The albatross plot for uptake of postnatal care is shown in Fig 12. Nine of the ten studies
showed a positive association; the magnitude of effect is likely to be a little above a RR of 1.1,
corresponding to at least a 5 percentage point increase; we considered this to be a moderate
effect.
Vouchers for maternity care services and quality of care. One study examined the effect
of vouchers for maternity care services on quality of care [59]. Watt et al. scored postnatal care
sessions (for women and newborns) against a checklist of services. The quality of care for
mothers (including history-taking, physical examination, danger signs advice, family planning
counselling, and risk assessment and management of HIV and sexually transmitted infections)
improved by 86% (p<0.05) with no evidence of improvement (p>0.1) in quality of postnatal
care for newborns (including feeding advice, newborn examination, danger signs advice and
documentation).
Costs, cost-effectiveness and cost-utility of vouchers for maternity care services. Four
studies examined the costs, cost-effectiveness or cost-utility of voucher for maternity care
Fig 11. Albatross plot for effect of vouchers for maternity care services on births in a health facility. MHVS—Maternal Health Voucher Scheme.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.g011
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services (Table 7). A study of Bangladesh’s Maternal Health Voucher Scheme found that the
incremental cost per birth with a skilled birth attendant was USD 69.85 [47]. An evaluation by
the IFPS Technical Assistance Project [54] showed that the cost per childbirth voucher used in
the Sambhav scheme in India was USD 66.60.
Separate studies of the Makerere University Voucher Scheme in Uganda estimated the cost
per childbirth to be USD 19.65 and USD 23.90 [63,64]. Alfonso et al. [63] calculated that the
cost per disability-adjusted life year (DALY) averted was USD 302–338 depending on the per-
spective used for analysis.
Vouchers for merit goods
Two studies examined the effect of the Tanzanian National Voucher Scheme (2004-present), a
programme that offered vouchers which entitled users to a discount of 3,250 shillings (USD
2.70) off insecticide-treated nets [66,67]. The programme had a phased roll-out and the value
of the discount increased over time. Sources of funding include the Global Fund to Fights
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the US President’s Malaria Initiative.
Fig 12. Albatross plot for effect of vouchers for maternity care services on uptake of postnatal care. MHVS—Maternal Health Voucher Scheme.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.g012
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Hanson et al.’s [67] before-and-after study (sample size 6,199 women in 2005, 6,260 in 2006
and 6,198 in 2007) found that longer exposure to the programme was associated with
increased use of insecticide-treated nets (p<0.1). Mulligan et al.’s [66] study found that the
cost per insecticide-treated net delivered to a home was USD 7.57 and the cost per child’s
death averted was USD 873.
Discussion
This systematic review of effectiveness included 51 quantitative studies that presented evidence
from 22 demand-side financing programmes across 20 countries in Latin America, sub-Saha-
ran Africa and Asia. There are important distinctions between different types of demand-side
financing, but there are now a sufficient number of studies (although only nine included stud-
ies were judged to be of high quality) from which to draw some conclusions about effects of
such schemes on utilisation of maternity care services through the mechanisms of conditional
cash transfers (16 studies), short-term cash payments (13 studies) or vouchers for maternity
care services (19 studies).
There was some evidence that, with the exception of unconditional cash transfers, demand-
side financing resulted in short- to medium-term positive effects on uptake of some (but not
all) maternity care services (Table 8). There was limited evidence about a longer-term effect on
uptake of maternity care services as most studies only collated data from a period of two to
three years after programme introduction. Evaluations of the Chiranjeevi Yojana in India pres-
ent a cautionary example in this regard. Early, methodologically poor studies suggested that
Table 7. Costs, cost-effectiveness and cost-utility of vouchers for maternity care services.
Study Study
data
Findings
Maternal Health Voucher Scheme,
Bangladesh (2007-present)
Hatt et al. (2010) 2009 Cost per voucher distributed: USD 41.37
Incremental cost per birth with a skilled birth
attendant: USD 69.85
Sambhav scheme, India (2007–2013)
IFPS Technical Assistance Project (2012) 2011 Cost per antenatal care voucher used: USD
5.20
Cost per delivery voucher used: USD 66.60
Cost per postnatal care voucher used: USD
3.30
Makerere University Voucher Scheme,
Uganda (2009–2011)
Alfonso et al. (2015) 2007–
2011
Cost per birth in a voucher hospital: USD 19.65
Cost per birth in a voucher hospital (incl. ANC
and PNC): USD 24.63
Cost per DALY averted (societal perspective):
USD 302
Cost per DALY averted (medical sector
perspective): USD 338
Mayora et al. (2014) 2010–
2011
Cost per childbirth: USD 23.90
Cost per postnatal care check-up: USD 7.90
Note. DALY denotes disability-adjusted life-year
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.t007
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the Chiranjeevi Yojana voucher-like scheme had successfully and significantly improved
uptake of maternity care services. However, recent evaluations which used more robust study
methods and collated data over a longer period found no evidence of effect.
Findings indicate that the effects of demand-side financing on uptake of maternity care ser-
vices are programme- and context-specific. It is plausible that any improvements in the out-
comes of interest may be more dependent on a complex set of factors including the baseline of
healthcare and social infrastructure from which they start and the range of barriers and facili-
tators known to influence a woman’s ability to access good quality maternity care. The
improvements that have been seen in the short- to medium-term uptake of maternity care ser-
vices as a result of demand-side financing interventions appeared to be linked to the specific
payment conditionalities or voucher entitlements.
The following general conclusions related to payment conditionalities can be drawn in this
respect:
• conditional cash transfers that included among their conditionalities the uptake of antenatal
care services appeared to have had an impact on the proportion of women receiving multiple
antenatal check-ups, but findings were less clear with respect to receipt of any antenatal care,
or on the uptake of other maternity care services in the continuum including childbirth and
postnatal care (not included as conditionalities);
• the only published study identified on unconditional cash transfers found no difference in
the uptake of any maternity care service;
• short-term cash payments which were contingent on the birth taking place in a facility or on
having a skilled attendant at birth showed an increase on the uptake of these services, but
findings were less clear of any effect on uptake of antenatal or postnatal care (even though
these services are also typically included within voucher entitlements);
• vouchers for maternity care services increased the uptake of services for which they provided
eligibility or subsidy, including antenatal care, skilled attendant at birth, facility births and,
to a lesser extent, postnatal care;
• the only (non-economic) included study on vouchers for merit goods (in this case insecti-
cide-treated nets) demonstrated an increase in the uptake of the nets.
Table 8. Summary of results from albatross plots for effects of demand-side financing on use of maternity care services.
Antenatal care Birth with a skilled birth
attendant
Birth in a healthcare facility Postnatal care
Conditional cash
transfers
Large positive effect
(estimated 10 percentage
point increase)
Limited positive effect Insufficient number of studies
to draw conclusions
Insufficient number of studies
to draw conclusions
Unconditional cash
transfers
Insufficient number of studies to draw conclusions
Short-term cash
payments to offset
costs
Limited positive effect Small positive effect
(estimated 2–3 percentage
point increase)
Moderate positive effect
(estimated 5 percentage point
increase)
Limited negative effect, or no
association
Vouchers for maternity
care services
Moderate positive effect
(estimated 5 percentage point
increase)
Large positive effect
(estimated 12–13 percentage
point increase)
Moderate positive effect
(estimated 5 percentage point
increase)
Moderate positive effect
(estimated 5 percentage point
increase)
Vouchers for merit
goods
Insufficient number of studies to draw conclusions
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068.t008
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Studies that disaggregated data by location found that demand-side financing increased
uptake of maternity care services in urban and rural areas, and this may be determined by the
perceived value of programme benefits relative to the costs for the family of accessing and
receiving care.
Targeting and verification systems involve additional resource burdens but no studies
were identified that had examined the costs of this aspect. Studies using disaggregated data
found that even those demand-side financing programmes targeted at low-income house-
holds increased the uptake of services across multiple wealth quintiles, as did programmes
without targeting. This suggests that in practice establishing and enforcing eligibility criteria
may be difficult or ineffective, which is corroborated in a linked review of evidence on expe-
riences with the implementation of cash transfers and vouchers [68]. Literature on cash
transfers in other social sectors has suggested that clear eligibility criteria can be effective at
targeting payments to the poorest groups [69,70], however payment conditionalities may be
counter-productive. Studies on cash transfers in the education sector have indicated that
conditionalities may make little difference to outcomes [71,72], and that conditionalities
may systematically exclude specific vulnerable groups if they are less likely to fulfil pro-
gramme requirements [73].
Studies that included sub-group analyses and presented data disaggregated by location or
type of healthcare facility have also provided some (albeit weak) indications that demand-
side financing programmes may be more effective at increasing uptake of maternity care ser-
vices in areas with better quality healthcare facilities (defined as those offering a greater
range of maternity care services) [42], and that effects on health outcomes are greater in
areas with better health infrastructure [35]. Earlier systematic reviews similarly highlighted
the importance of existing infrastructure and achieving at least a minimum level of quality
for care [4,5,10].
Few studies (none of high quality) measured the effect of demand-side financing pro-
grammes on the quality of care received by women attending healthcare facilities. Those that
did so used a narrow range of measures of ‘quality’ on which they found limited evidence of
effect. Most indicators used to measure quality of care concerned receipt of specific procedures
such as vaccinations or the provision of educational information on signs and symptoms of
adverse health outcomes in pregnancy. While some studies found improvements on these
specified indicators [21,24,39,43,59], others did not [31,39,43,59]. Only one study took a
broader approach to quality of care that considered effects on hospital cleanliness, respectful
behaviour by hospital staff and, conversely, use of dangerous practices [39]. That study found
no differences in outcomes of interest.
It has been suggested that programmes including vouchers for maternity care services and
output-based payments to providers are well placed to improve quality of care [74,75], how-
ever there remains a paucity of evidence to support that assertion. Only one study examined
outcomes relevant to quality of care [59], and found that the quality of postpartum care for
mothers improved (as assessed by the number of procedures performed including history-tak-
ing, physical examination, danger signs advice, family planning counselling, risk assessment
and management of HIV and sexually transmitted infections) but no evidence of an effect on
quality of postnatal care for newborns (when scored against a list of procedures including feed-
ing advice, newborn examination, danger signs and symptoms advice and documentation).
No studies considered ‘quality’ from the perspective of women service users.
The only published study so far to compare demand-side financing with supply-side invest-
ment (a short-term cash payment programme compared to free 24-hour care in a district hos-
pital in the Indian state of Haryana) suggested that the latter may be equally as effective at
increasing uptake of maternity care services [32], but further, robust evidence is required.
Effects of cash transfers and vouchers on maternity care services: Systematic review
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0173068 March 22, 2017 31 / 37
We identified a small number of studies which considered the cost-effectiveness of
demand-side financing interventions. Where data on costs were considered, it was with regard
to vouchers for maternity care services or merit goods and was largely limited to studies that
determined costs per voucher used. The authors of a study on the Makerere University
Voucher Scheme in Uganda [63] Eˆlculated an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio for the pro-
gramme and noted that their result was highly cost-effective according to World Health Orga-
nization thresholds for health interventions. We found no comparative evidence to indicate if
vouchers for maternity care services are more or less expensive than supply-side investment
with similar effects on short-term coverage rates. Likewise, we found no comparative evidence
on the cost-effectiveness of cash transfers with regards to use and quality of maternal and new-
born health. Evaluative research on cash transfers in other social sectors suggests that such pro-
grammes have lower administrative costs than some supply-side investments, particularly in
the medium- to long-term, but also that costs are increased by resource-intensive monitoring
of conditionalities [76,77].
Review findings indicate a need for more methodologically robust studies that examine the
effects of demand-side financing programmes in the longer term and not just during a pilot
project or two-three years following programme launch, and for greater disaggregation of data
according to wealth in order to determine the equity effects of programmes. There remains a
paucity of research on effects of demand-side financing on maternal and infant health out-
comes and women’s views of care received. Future studies need to incorporate multiple inter-
vention arms in order to avoid research designs that only compare indicators in areas with a
demand-side financing programme to those in areas with no additional investment at all.
Without future research on programme cost-effectiveness and also on the extent of out-of-
pocket costs incurred or defrayed by families as a result of participation in a demand-side
financing programme, it will not be possible to determine whether demand-side financing
approaches are a better policy option than increasing supply-side investments in public sector
maternity provision.
This systematic review identified and retrieved evidence using a broad set of search terms
and databases. One weakness of the review is that it only used English search terms and
English language databases. The least methodologically robust studies (for example those that
did not include comparators or statistical testing between groups) were excluded from the
review however some of the included studies were at high risk of bias due to the observational
design which lacked internal validity, small sample sizes and a lack of testing or adjustment for
potential confounding factors.
Some evaluation studies compared recipients with non-recipients, a technique which may
overestimate the impact of demand-side financing programmes if, in the absence of the pro-
gramme, the recipients were already more likely to use maternity care services than non-recip-
ients. This issue is particularly pertinent for programmes in which vouchers were sold to
women (specifically the Vouchers for Health programme in Kenya, pilot voucher programmes
in Pakistan and HealthyBaby vouchers in Uganda) as it is possible that women who purchased
vouchers were already more inclined to seek maternity care and thus more likely to use them.
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, our comparisons between and within the different
types of demand-side financing should be interpreted with caution due to the heterogeneity of
programme aims, design, administration and setting. We have drawn conclusions based on
evidence from 22 programmes in 20 countries, mostly conditional cash transfers, short-term
cash payments and vouchers for maternity care services. There are common features, notably
a transfer of resources to users of healthcare, but there are also important differences and we
have drawn attention to specific issues that emerge from those differences throughout this
paper.
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Conclusions
Demand-side financing approaches have been widely introduced in low- and middle-income
countries during the last 10–15 years. Our systematic review consolidated evidence from seven
published systematic reviews of evidence on the impact of different types of demand-side
financing on maternal health, and updated the systematic searches to June 2015. A substantial
number of studies have examined the effect of demand-side financing on the use of maternity
care services, although many focus on an initial programme period, usually two or three years
after initiation. Further evidence is still needed on whether programmes are effective longer-
term. Findings suggest that demand-side financing approaches tied to service use (either via
payment conditionalities or vouchers for selected services) could increase the uptake of specific
maternity care services such as antenatal care, use of a skilled attendant at birth and in the case
of vouchers, postnatal care, but that effects appear to be programme and context-specific and
may depend on a complex set of barriers and facilitators related to social factors and condi-
tions in the healthcare system. Effects were seen in rural and urban areas and across wealth
quintiles. There are few studies to indicate that demand-side financing approaches have
improved quality of maternity care or other maternal and newborn health outcomes. Compar-
ative studies, including on whether these programmes are more cost-effective than supply-side
investment in public services, research on social impact, including equity, research on health
impact, including implications of increasing caesarean section rates, and cost-effectiveness
studies are lacking.
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